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INTRODUCTION: A PORTRAIT OF OSH, KYRGYZSTAN
Osh, the “southern capital” of Kyrgyzstan located in the eth-nically rich Ferghana Valley, is a network of streets and lanes gradually rising into a tree-lined urban landscape 
from surroundings of yellow hills and flatter expanses of farmland. 
Even from an initial cursory glance, unlikely juxtapositions perhaps 
only to be found in this region of the world leap out. Walking a 
straight course along, say Ulitsa Lenina or Kurmanzhan-Datka, 
one could travel from the busy bazaar where vendors sell melons, 
flat rounds of tandoor bread, and hard balls of dried yogurt, past 
Soviet blocks of apartments and smaller alleys leading into mahallas 
of courtyard houses, to the main government “white house” across 
from an imposing statue of Lenin. Osh’s face seems to be that of 
“two cities” which “captures the coexisting presence of divergent 
orientations and aspirations within the city.” But even a two-sided 
characterization dividing this urban space into a Soviet sector and 
a “traditional Central Asian” sector is too simple (Liu 2007, 66). 
Seemingly contradictory beliefs, habits, and identities overlap and 
spill out of bounded domains, manifesting themselves in various 
aspects of everyday life in Osh, whether in terms of religious identi-
fication, ethnic connections, national sentiments, linguistic choice, 
or merely commonplace practices. 
In these interviews, language reveals itself to be a window onto 
the forces that shape cultural and national identity: it illuminates 
dialogues of power within a society and shapes politics, builds na-
tional solidarity, and underscores group divides. It is malleable, and 
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yet powerful in its malleability. To understand the variety of exist-
ing attitudes and sentiments towards the different languages spo-
ken in Osh and, on a more general level, in Central Asia, we must 
examine the historical trajectory of nationality policy. The legacies 
of Tsarist administration and Soviet nationality policy in attempt-
ing to consolidate language and identity in Central Asian republics 
may have directed identity development in a particular fashion and 
shaped the official methodology of nation-building after the col-
lapse of the Soviet Union, but they did not undermine the region’s 
diversity; in fact, they may have highlighted it. 
In my attempt to trace the complexities of identity in Central 
Asia, I first discuss the theoretical background of nation-building 
and language planning, then the historical essentializing processes 
of nationality during Tsarist and Soviet times, both of official policy 
and native involvement. I then bring the discussion into post-So-
viet times by examining how essentialist Soviet legacies are main-
tained in independent Kyrgyzstan. Finally, I look at a case study 
from my field research in Osh. Osh, as a reflective microcosm of 
Central Asian society, illustrates a linguistically dynamic concep-
tion of identity. While explicit, verbal identification is significant to 
notions of ethnicity, the coexistence of multiple languages within 
the same sphere of usage has produced an interesting phenomenon, 
that of habitual code-switching. In the last section of this paper, I 
address code-switching, along with other everyday sentiments and 
attitudes, in an attempt to dig under official discourse and break 
the essentialist model.
 
THEORIES OF NATION-BUILDING AND CREATION OF 
NATIONAL LANGUAGES
The point must first be made that idea of the nation-state—
the right of each unified, distinct national entity to sovereignty—is 
a fairly modern concept emerging out of a specifically Western 
historic and cultural context in the nineteenth century. Moreover, 
theorists, most prominently Benedict Anderson (1983), argue that 
nations themselves are “imagined communities.” If unifying con-
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nections are to be found on as wide a scale as the national level, 
then those linking threads must be forged through consciously 
standardized narratives of shared history and authenticated heri-
tage. This paper is concerned with the process of nation-building in 
these terms, i.e., creating and promulgating an official discourse of 
national legitimacy and collective identity rather than the building 
up of state capacity and infrastructure. Language plays a key role 
in this cultural imagining of community. While formal Saussurian 
linguistics make a strong distinction between the primacy of speech 
over writing, when it comes to examining the political power of 
language, writing plays an equally, or perhaps even more, crucial 
role as spoken language. In a world of over six thousand spoken 
tongues, there are only two hundred written languages. Writing 
provides fixity, slows down language change, and is thus conducive 
to standardization and the spread of literacy. In instances of lan-
guage planning and consolidations of national identity, it is writing 
that exerts force and fuels these processes. Anderson argues that 
what really swept this movement into force was the standardiza-
tion of written tradition with new print technologies which widely 
disseminated a uniform system of written language and literature. 
Because all languages have degrees of dialectical variation, at some 
point in the history of any modern nation a moment must occur 
when a centralized government seeking to unify regionalized terri-
tories attempts to create a national standard language, and, through 
this, a unified national identity. 
There are several different ways to go about establishing a 
standard language, and all are aided by the creation of a strong writ-
ing system, which gives fixity to amorphous orality. One method is 
to base the standard on a classical historical form. This normally 
occurs with languages with rich written traditions. For example, 
Modern Standard Arabic is based on the seventh to ninth century 
classical Arabic of the Quran and other Islamic literatures. Some-
times the creation of a standard can be completely devoid of ver-
nacular influences. Standard German until about the nineteenth 
century existed almost completely only in writing; its existence 
comes from the molding of written language over centuries by writ-
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ers who sought to write in a way most comprehensible to speakers 
of the different German dialects.  A standard language can also be 
constructed by creating a more egalitarian blend of its different dia-
lects; or an attempt may be made to trace back to an ancient “proto-
dialect”. One frequent method of standardization is the emergence 
of one dialect’s dominance over other rivals. Sometimes this hap-
pens through more natural processes—often under the influence 
of writing. The Italian standard language, for instance, is based pri-
marily on the Tuscan dialect as a result of the influence of Dante’s 
writings. 
Sometimes the dominance of one dialect over the others is 
enforced by centralized authority. China, despite its projected iden-
tity as a solid and unified ancient culture, has undergone various at-
tempts at unification, and thus many movements for language stan-
dardization. The Beijing dialect became the standard in the early 
twentieth century through concerted efforts by the Commission 
on the Unification of Pronunciation. The spread of this standard 
was the result of its mandatory instruction in all schools across the 
country. In the case of Kyrgyz, Soviet planners methodically sought 
to distinguish it from other Turkic languages, its linguistic neigh-
bors. Robert Lowe writes that “language was seized upon as a key 
element of identity and the underdeveloped Kyrgyz tongue was 
given a script (Arabic, then Latin, later Cyrillic), an expanded vo-
cabulary, grammar, dictionaries, literature, and other elements nec-
essary to declare it formally as a separate Turkic language” (Lowe 
2003, 109–110). Creating national identity through such means as 
standardizing language basically essentializes identity. Essentialism 
takes the perspective that “those who occupy an identity category 
are both fundamentally similar to one another and fundamentally 
different from members of other groups.” 
While the theoretical position of essentialism is deconstruct-
ed and criticized in academic discourse as it does not take into 
consideration the overlapping and constantly changing nature of 
identities, a mentality of essentialism nevertheless guides the goals 
and methods of nation-building. A collective identity is solidified 
in opposition to a foil of alterity, an Other to heighten the sense of 
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sameness within a group. Heterogeneous environments are there-
fore conducive to strong group formations due to repeated contacts 
with differentiated Others. 
HISTORY OF NATION-BUILDING AND LANGUAGE 
PLANNING IN CENTRAL ASIA
The impulse linking standard language with standard litera-
ture as the soul of national consciousness, discussed in early nine-
teenth century texts such as Fredrich von Schlegel’s “Literature and 
National Character,” spread outwards from its Western roots with 
European colonization, reaching Central Asia through Russian ex-
pansion. The Romantic essentializing of identity through linguis-
tic standardization and the establishment of a polar “us” versus the 
Other mentality is apparent in the sphere of Central Asia through-
out Tsarist and Soviet rule. 
Before Russian expansion into Central Asia, the two reigning 
linguistic trends were acceptance and assimilation. This region, with 
its diverse collection of cultures, languages, and religions, was open 
to the influence of the languages crossing its social space. Bilingual-
ism or multilingualism was the rule and language was seen as a 
tool for communication; different languages commanded different 
niches depending on situation and addressee. Russian movement 
into the steppes and Turkestan brought with it the Western Ro-
mantic idea that language is not only functional, but also a marker 
of shared consciousness and identity (Segars 2003, 92–94). The 
fixation on language as the defining feature in categorizing groups is 
revealed by the legal category of inorodtsy in Imperial Russia, which 
was meant to distinguish aliens from ethnic Russians. The evolu-
tion of the meaning of inorodtsy over the years reveals the difficulty 
in finding a satisfactory marker of that identity. The classification 
of the peoples of Central Asia caused great confusion because eth-
nicity in the region historically had not consisted of neat catego-
ries dividing each group clearly from others. People identified with 
multiple groups variably based on language, kinship, religion, and 
lifestyle; identity was often contradictory, but it was an accepted 
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norm. The Western and particularly Enlightenment sensibility 
compelled the classification and ordering of this space into a clearly 
delineated grid. The term inorodtsy shifted from being anchored in 
race to religion, finding none of these fully adequate, and finally set-
tling on language as the most appropriate fit. 
With that essentializing model of political rhetoric hanging in 
the air from Tsarist legacy, new Soviet rule unhesitatingly exploited 
this mechanism, establishing concerted language planning efforts. 
Discussion of the Soviet empire and its role in building the na-
tionalities of Central Asia raised the question of whether this new 
empire fit a more “classical” model of colonial empire or whether it 
conceived itself as something else altogether. Scholars have written 
that it is too simplistic to see the Soviet regime as merely another 
colonial power which, when carving territory for the national Au-
tonomous Soviet Socialist Republics, was really doing so as a “di-
vide and rule” tactic, though admittedly delimitation did make the 
region easier to administer. 
In reality, Hirsch argues, according to Soviet ideals, “nation” 
was really just a “transitional stage on the evolutionary timeline,” 
and they imagined the future of the Soviet Union as one devoid 
of nations and nationalism, an integrated socialist union (Hirsch 
2000). During the Soviet period, the ultimate goal was the forma-
tion of a large socialist polity under which each of its citizens first 
and foremost considered himself to be a Soviet citizen. The inter-
esting contradiction, however, is that toward the process of creat-
ing a whole, the parts first had to be separated and “strengthened,” 
creating a bifurcated identity of dva potoka. The five Central Asian 
Soviet Socialist Republics were carefully delimitated and their con-
stituent nationalities defined and cultivated, with the official label 
that this was a necessary but passing stage of modernizing the na-
tive populations of the region. Arne Haugen (2003) writes that the 
Soviet regime  strove to reproduce the nation as a modern entity 
—with a centralized bureaucracy, administration, education orga-
nization, and so on—in Central Asia.  It seems that this school of 
thought long had precedence with Russian rule in Central Asia, 
from Catherinian notions of cultivating Islam on the steppes as a 
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modernizing force among the backward nomads to Ilminsky’s na-
tive language policy of first teaching schoolchildren to read with 
Cyrillic orthographies of their native tongue before advancing to 
the Russian language in hopes of improving literacy.  It is not dif-
ficult to believe that nation-building was undertaken to modernize, 
rather than solely to weaken, Central Asia, but at the same time this 
goal of modernization is also intrinsically essentialist. The method 
of carving the region into separate republics was based on “three 
main principles: national-ethnographic, economic, and finally the 
principle of administrative order” (Haugen 2003, 181). The latter 
two principles often overrode the first, because Soviet administra-
tion viewed pure ethnic homogeneity as of no inherent value. To 
establish truly modern nations, other principles were more impor-
tant—delineating areas with viable economies and ensuring that 
each republic be equipped with a major urban center to maintain 
administrative order. Language policies of this period were also 
motivated by the goal of modernization.
Isabelle Kreindler divides Soviet language planning into three 
periods: from 1917 to 1930, 1930 to 1958, and 1958 to 1985. The 
first period, based on Lenin’s attitudes and the slogan “national in 
form, socialist in content,” advocated the active promotion of na-
tive languages. The first stage of the indigenization, or koronizatsia, 
campaign, adopted in 1923 until 1927, stated that “administration 
of national republics should be made up of predominantly local 
people, knowing the language, way of life, morals and customs of 
the corresponding peoples” and that all official positions must be 
occupied by native representatives using the native tongue. Orthog-
raphies of Central Asia’s spoken languages were Latinized in 1926 
in order to eradicate mass illiteracy, which was cast as a relic of 
backwardness and exploitation by the bourgeois elite. During the 
second phase of Soviet planning period, however, language policy 
took less active initiative toward native language promotion, per-
haps due to an unexpected backlash and the complications that 
emerged out of implementation during the first phase. Qualified 
native officials had been scarce due to low literacy levels among the 
largely rural populace, and even when they were available, many 
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were loath to stay in positions that immersed them in a Russian-
dominated environment where they often encountered bitter senti-
ments from their “elder brothers.” 
During the second period in 1938, Russian instruction was 
made mandatory and the Latin writing systems put into usage in 
1926 were replaced by the Cyrillic alphabet. Interestingly, Russian 
was pushed forth as the dominant and common language of the 
Soviet Union, crucial for the Sovietization process of non-Rus-
sian populations, but “on the other hand, the regime was unwilling 
to retreat on native-language education sufficiently to ensure that 
young people would learn Russian first and foremost” (Blitstein 
2001, 267). Blitstein describes the realities of this program further, 
saying that “native-language schools in most union republics did see 
an increase in the time devoted to the Russian language, but the 
decree actually led to a decrease in the number of hours devoted to 
Russian in the non-Russian schools of the RSFSR, compared to 
schedules for years past” (Blitstein 2001, 258).  
In 1958, Soviet language policy entered its third period where 
mandatory native-language education was eliminated and non-
Russian parents were provided a choice of sending their children to 
Russian language schools if they so desired. The true and actuated 
advance of the Russian language into the space of native tongues 
was effected during this period through the introduction of a new 
type of non-Russian school. In these schools, native language and 
literature remained as curricular subjects, but the general medium 
of instruction became the Russian language. The methods of this 
last period persisted until perestroika in 1985. 
NATIVE INVOLVEMENT IN DEFINING LANGUAGE AND
IDENTITY
In order to put official policies in perspective, it must be noted 
that the idea that the nationalities of Central Asia was created by 
an external, essentializing hand, is too simplistic a model. The na-
tive subjects themselves were not completely acquiescing puppets 
controlled by forces over which they had no say. During both the 
155Journal of Politics & Society
Tsarist and the Soviet periods, the indigenous populations of Cen-
tral Asia were often actively involved in the process of defining their 
group identities and national languages. The strongest example of 
this during the Tsarist era was the Jadid movement, which called 
for the modernization of Islam and promoted the creation of a 
Pan-Turkic language and nation. The Jadid movement was inter-
esting because at the same time as it drew influence from Russia’s 
embodiment (to the Jadids) of Western progressive ideologies, it 
sought to distinguish itself as a people separate from the Russians. 
This led the Jadids to criticize the traditional Muslim education 
of the madrasa system as backwards and to emphasize Russified 
or Westernized forms of modernity and education, which entailed 
reformed Islam, an understanding of history, and improved literacy. 
In Jadid literature, such as Tales of an Indian Traveler by Bukharan 
Jadid Abdurrauf Fitrat, Russian personas often represented edu-
cation and intellectuality, “models to be emulated.” Adeeb Khalid 
writes that “the Jadids had internalized several categories of colonial 
knowledge, yet their very assertion of the universality of progress 
subverted these categories” (Khalid 1997, 191–200). This same 
inspiration gotten from the Russian “elder brother,” inspired the Ja-
dids to form a more definitive and distinct pan-Turkic identity. In 
hopes of unifying the Turkic peoples of Central Asia, Ismail Bey 
Gasprinsky, ideological predecessor of the Jadids, pursued several 
principles of unity, one of them being the unity of language. He 
proposed the usage of Ottoman Turkish as the common Turkic lit-
erary language, but ultimately this failed to flower due to nontrivial 
differences between the Turkic tongues spoken across such a wide 
area as from Crimea to the Volga to the Kazakh steppe and deep 
into Turkestan.   
While Soviet policies in later years sought to mold its ter-
ritories and the people within them, creating an environment for 
nationhood by giving ethnic identity real political and economic 
meaning, titular nationalities under the Soviet Union were not 
merely passive sheep in a pen. Adrienne Edgar gives examples of 
this in her analysis of nation-building in Soviet Turkmenistan. The 
Turkmen played important roles in shaping the discourse on na-
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tionality, rejecting the idea of a pan-Turkic language “as linguistic 
imperialism,” instead “preferring to emphasize the distinctiveness of 
the Turkmen vernacular rather than its commonalities with other 
Turkic dialects” (Edgar 2004, 9). But although Turkmen intellectu-
als had adopted Soviet ideas on language as an essential component 
to shaping nationality, they were unable to divorce their concep-
tions of language from their traditional Turkmen genealogical and 
tribal basis of identity formation. Ultimately, through an essential-
izing process, these internal differences were covered up and the 
Teke dialect, which was the dialect of the largest tribe and consti-
tuted the majority of Turkmen intelligentsia emerged as dominant, 
and as representing the whole of a united Turkmen identity. This 
procedure diluted linguistic differences and succeeded because a 
greater goal was at hand, which was that this unity was necessary 
to distinguish the Turkmen as a legitimate nationality in contrast 
to other groups in the region. As the new Turkmen elites were 
drawn together from across the republic to Ashgabat, “the subdivi-
sions within the Turkmen population came to seem less important 
than the huge cultural and linguistic gap between Turkmen and 
Europeans” (Edgar 2004, 94). This example of native involvement 
in identity building in Turkmenistan is merely one specific example 
of native groups participating in the process of nationality creation 
across the Central Asian space.
For example, during the period of geographic and national 
delineation of the Ferghana Valley, the Kyrgyz and Uzbeks adopted 
Soviet ideas and phraseology for ethnic categorization and admin-
istrative functionality to articulate their desires for territory. They 
used the standard of “psychological make-up” from Stalin’s ideol-
ogy of a nation to argue for their own ideas of national boundar-
ies. Many groups of people wrote letters to the government asking 
to be incorporated into a certain republic claiming that nationality 
should not be seen along along Tsarist- and Soviet-influenced divi-
sions of socio-economic lifestyles, but should rahter be conceived 
along how individuals personally believe them to be. 
The people of these regions, using whatever standards and 
measures they have adopted, self-identify with one group or an-
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other, and thus their “psychological make-up,” according to Stalinist 
rhetoric, determines which nation they feel they best fit into. At the 
same time, it is a stretch to argue that these native groups are pur-
posefully using official frameworks in which they themselves have 
no faith, to subvert established order. It is apparent that they also 
followed these categories and definitions—as evidenced by later 
independent nations corresponding to earlier administrative units, 
and the lasting presence of the five main nationalities that emerged 
during the Soviet era in post-Soviet political space. Turning back to 
the specific case in Kyrgyzstan, we can examine how nation-build-
ing was carried over from the Soviet period into independence.
NATION-BUILDING AND LANGUAGE PLANNING IN 
POST-SOVIET KYRGYZSTAN 
When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the independent 
republics of Central Asia were faced with the task of maintaining 
national rule and unity on their own. Though independence had 
come undesired to Kyrgyzstan, the emerging nation was now nev-
ertheless confronted with the need to exist as a truly independent 
and coherent nation-state. Until the Soviet period implemented its 
policies to solidify national identities, Kyrgz society was based on 
kinship and lineage ties rather than national sentiments. 
Soviet scholar S. M. Abramzon admits that “the question of 
the origins of the Kyrgyz nation is among the most complex and 
controversial aspects of the ethnic history of Central Asia” (Hus-
key 1993, 412). Adopting Soviet-styled policies and essentialist 
rhetoric, the independent government former Kyryz president 
Akayev created and promulgated a national ideology that sought 
to legitimize the nation’s existence. The Kyrgyz SSR had been one 
of the least “nationally conscious” republics in the Soviet Union and 
the challenge post-independence was that of filling the “ideological 
vacuum left by the discrediting of the communist system” (Lowe 
2003, 114). Although a significant number of diverse ethnic mi-
norities lived in Kyrgyzstan, the path toward building a strong Kyr-
gyz nation was one which muted diversity and elevated symbols of 
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the dominant culture and its traditions. 
Although in 1989 there was an ethnically heterogenous pop-
ulation in Kyrgyzstan, 1999, the census reported the number of 
individuals identifying themselves as Kyrgyz as increased by twelve 
percent. The mass migration of Russians and other European 
groups, most of whom had higher levels of education and occu-
pied positions in the academic, governmental, or white-collar sec-
tors, was termed the “brain drain.” While a recent survey showed 
that only 12 percent of Russians had emigrated due to “linguistic 
reasons” (most cited “greater economic opportunities”), the govern-
ment of Kyrgyzstan attempted to promote the nation as a “multi-
ethnic, civic state” (Korth 2005, 119). The government sought to 
reassure minority groups of their welcomed status in the new na-
tion—as exemplified by Akaev’s slogan “Civil Consensus and Na-
tion Unity—Yes; Chauvinism, Nationalism and Extremism—No.” 
Nevertheless, the major steps taken by official policy were those 
which sought to foster a shared sense of Kyrgyz national pride and 
to ground Kyrgyz national identity in “authentic” origins, as defined 
by standards of the same thread of Western Romantic thought that 
was imported to Central Asia through Russian and Soviet rule. The 
contradiction in essentialist policies becomes clear here as “national 
consolidation is essential to avoid the kind of fragmentation and 
political schism arising from such division that was witnessed in 
Tajikistan. Yet nation-builders in their homogenizing zeal fail to 
harness the cultural and other diversities within the nation” (Pat-
naik 2003, 144).
The process of strengthening the sense of nation included an 
emphasis of ethnosymbols, such as the symbolism of flag design. 
Like the banner flown by the legendary Kyrgyz warrior Manas, 
the bold red flag is emblazoned with a forty-rayed sun represent-
ing the forty historical Kyrgyz tribes, and also with a tunduk, the 
roof of a yurt, symbolizing the Kyrgyz’s nomadic heritage. Ethno-
symbols also sought to link the people and nation with the specific 
plot of land they now occupied. The state seal of Kyrgyzstan, for 
example, depicts the sun rising above the striking peaks of the Ala-
Too mountains on the shores of Lake Issyk-Kul. History is also 
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used in the legitimizing process as authorities search for “original 
authenticity” in order for past unity to justify the existence of a 
collective modern nation. Having been a non-literate culture for 
centuries, the oral Manas epic has seen intense and mass revival as 
both mythology and ancient history. The epic is not only recited, 
it is also reenacted at elaborate festivals on national holidays, and 
has inspired books, films, TV shows, operas, even comics (Lowe 
2003, 117). Islam, embodied as national religious custom, is an-
other marker of national identity, though on the official level, this 
appears in a glossed, superficial form. Each of these essentializing 
strategies for identity building could be analyzed in much greater 
depth, but in this paper, I will select to look at linguistic strategies 
in more detail.
During the last years of Soviet rule, “it was clear that Kyrgyz 
was one of the weakest titular languages in the Soviet Union” and, 
in fact, Russian had taken the position as “the first language of the 
urban Kyrgyz elite” (Lowe 2003, 118). Post-independence, there-
fore, people of the former Kyrgyz SSR found themselves liberated 
from policies of former “colonizers,” but habits of that earlier era 
still remained. And so the Russian language still found itself be-
ing used in education, administration, and even for private matters, 
mostly among the urban and educated population. Efforts were 
made to increase the usage and prestige of Kyrgyz in society, yet 
even these attempts contained within them the remnants of a colo-
nial mentality and policy. 
Just as the Tsarist and Soviet administrations had held on to 
a tenuous link between nation and language (perhaps more clearly 
seen during the last period of Soviet language policy, when Rus-
sian became inarguably the dominant language throughout the 
multiethnic Soviet Union), “many Central Asian governments have 
turned to the model of the modern nation-state in which the titular 
nation defines the state language, although this model of a mono-
ethnic and monolingual state does not correspond to their social 
reality” (Korth 2005, 116). Even before the complete collapse of 
the Soviet Union, the Kyrgyz parliament passed the Law on State 
Language, for perhaps more symbolic reasons of asserting national 
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pride than anything else, which made Kyrgyz the state language and 
Russian the “language of inter-ethnic communication” (Lowe 2003, 
118). This corresponds to the current status of official languages in 
the independent Kyrgyz Republic, which maintains Kyrgyz as the 
“state language” and Russian as the “official language.” Most schools 
are double-tracked, meaning that parents can choose to send their 
children to school on either a Russian track, where the language 
of instruction is Russian, or a Kyrgyz track, where the language of 
instruction is Kyrgyz. At least in urban areas, students on the Kyr-
gyz track still take a Russian language subject class, and vice versa. 
This is reminiscent of the final period of language planning during 
the Soviet period, when non-Russian families could choose to send 
their children to an all-Russian instruction school. Nevertheless, 
Kyrgyz is gaining ground with purposeful planning efforts—place 
names have been stripped of their Soviet attributions and given 
Kyrgyz ones instead, and the National Commission on State Lan-
guage has announced requirements that mandate the use of Kyrgyz 
in all official documentation. Most scholars, including Lowe and 
Korth, however, predict that despite the public’s general acceptance 
of official rhetoric enhancing the prestige of Kyrgyz, Russian will 
still be planted firmly as the lingua franca among the majority of 
people due to high ethnic diversity which most Kyrgyz-language 
campaigns do not specifically accommodate. 
In response, other minorities employ what could be termed 
“strategic essentialism” in order to emphasize their voice as cohe-
sive and legitimate within Kyrgyzstan, where they see the rise of 
Kyrgyz nationalism as a threat. Strategic essentialism may be used 
in the formation of any social identity where complexities are over-
simplified for a crafted subversive purpose. For example, faced with 
official characterizations of Kyrgyz national identity, Uzbeks living 
in Osh assert their own collective identity as a firm and fixed uni-
fied whole. In my conversations with Uzbek individuals living in 
Osh, they asserted that historically, the Ferghana Valley has been 
the dominant home of the settled Uzbek population, and that the 
original home of the nomadic Kyrgyz was further north in the 
mountains around the provinces of Chuy and Issyk-Kul. This ig-
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nores the complex history of settlement in the Ferghana Valley as 
well as the initially vague separation of Ferghana’s population into 
distinct and separate ethnic groups, but this is a reassertion of the 
legitimate belonging of the Uzbek population in a place they view 
as their historic homeland. They connect the language they speak 
to the Uzbek language spoken by over 30 million people world-
wide—many more than those who speak Kyrgyz—even though the 
Tashkent dialect of Uzbek is different from the dialect spoken in 
the Ferghana Valley. In a region of the world where, only a few cen-
turies earlier, languages were seen more as distinct but not wholly 
unconnected dialectical shades, this characterization nevertheless 
imbues the Uzbek language with a sense of power and authority in 
a Kyrgyz nation where it is neglected on the official level. 
BREAKING DOWN ESSENTIALIZED IDENTITY
Ultimately, however, essentialist models are analyzed in order 
to be broken down. Bucholtz elaborates, “[I]dentity inheres in ac-
tions, not in people. As the product of situated social action, iden-
tities may shift and recombine to meet new circumstances” (Bu-
choltz and Hall, 2003, 376). And so those same Uzbeks described 
above, who in one situation emphasize the important distinctions 
between themselves and the Kyrgyz, may in another prioritize the 
distinction between their urban Russified status in contrast to rural 
and traditional populations. They may, while in conversation with 
a Bishkek native, characterize themselves as “Osh-ski,” a person of 
Osh; or in dealings with an Uzbek from Tashkent, actually prefer 
to name themselves as citizens of Kyrgyzstan. Paitnak writes: 
Post-structuralists suggest that ethnic identity is a shift-
ing, contested and negotiated category. Since it is always 
in the process of being constructed and reconstructed, 
the collapse of the Soviet Union put strains on those 
structures that defined ethnic identity in Central Asia, 
notwithstanding the attempts to create a ‘simple, given, 
bounded’ national entity. The nationalist project of fur-
162 Zhou  •  Language in Central Asian Nation-Building
ther fortifying those structures have complicated inter 
and intra-ethnic relations (Paitnak 2003, 154).
 
Montgomery shows that the diversity of religious beliefs and prac-
tices including common, cultural “religion on the streets” in Kyr-
gyzstan and, by relation, in the rest of Central Asia is part of a 
process of socialization (Montgomery 2007, 366–367). The shift-
ing identities in community customs of Islam is, from my experi-
ence, a good analogy for the performance of language as a part of 
this process of socialization as well. Turning back to the example 
of Suleiman-Too set up in the introduction, upon closer examina-
tion, it is clear that in addition to the sacred usage of Suleiman-Too 
Mountain as a place of religious worship, the mountain is a setting 
for the constantly changing values of space and community, and has 
come to symbolize meaning outside of the religious as well. Sulei-
man-Too creates a social space for the diverse population of Osh 
and its surrounding regions; older religious traditions and even 
those cultural meanings have been overlaid with a newer, socially 
significant purpose.  Individuals, friends, families, couples, regular-
ly climb the mountain not necessarily with religious pilgrimage in 
mind (though some certainly do). and for young lovers, it can serve 
as a venue for more amorous activities. The cemetery at the base of 
the mountain next to Rabat Abdullah Khan Mosque also becomes 
a meeting spot for Osh’s drug users. The place is seen by them as a 
sort of safe haven for their activities. Thus, the “multiple meanings” 
of this sacred space are not stagnant, but continue to accumulate 
through continued usage and continued acceptance of its religious, 
cultural, and social importance in the community over time.
Language usage and linguistic meanings are, similarly, neither 
stagnant nor static. Meaning in language accumulates and changes 
as part of the process of socialization. In the analysis of language in 
this final section, we shift away from essentializations of linguistic 
identity to the elusive moments, normalized contradictions, and 
continuous shifts of daily communication and linguistic attitudes 
in Central Asia—specifically turning back to the scope of youth in 
Osh, Kyrgyzstan. In order to deconstruct essentialist perspectives, 
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it is sometimes necessary to step away from established academic 
analyses and methods of cohesive interpretations, and to do so I 
will be incorporating my sociolinguistic field research and personal 
encounters with everyday life in Osh.
The general linguistic divide in Osh could be simplified into 
Russian versus Kyrgyz versus Uzbek, but this picture is compli-
cated by the realization that there is often little correspondence be-
tween nationality and national language. And so both urban Kyr-
gyz and Uzbeks will distinguish themselves from rural populations 
using the Russian language—urban-educated groups speak Rus-
sian, while the rural—even those who have in recent years moved 
into the city—do not. A similar distinction is made in contrast to 
those who lead a traditional lifestyle by those Kyrgyz and Uzbeks 
who see themselves as modern and more “Western”—they read 
Russian-language literature and publications, watch the Russian 
“First Channel” on television—because they or their parents were 
educated in Russia during the Soviet period. 
To further complicate matters, we can once again bring into 
conversation the young Uzbek-Kyrgyz man who identified as 
Russian because of a personal connection with the beauty of the 
Russian language or engage in dialogue several Russian teenagers 
I interviewed whose families still remained in Osh after the mas-
sive deflux of the Russian population and who told me that they 
fluently speak both Uzbek and Kyrgyz with their friends, having 
learned these languages not in schools but as children playing out-
side together in the dvor. We also have the patriotic Kyrgyz youth 
who insist that all must speak Kyrgyz and who, even when they 
speak to Uzbeks, always address them in either Russian or Kyrgyz, 
resulting in whole conversations carried out with each individual 
speaking his own tongue, despite the fact that they may have ba-
sic fluency in the other’s language. There are also Uzbeks who say 
that maintaining the Kyrgyz language is important since, after all, 
they are citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic, and there are Kyrgyz who 
likewise believe in the importance of knowing enough Uzbek to 
communicate with a large sector of the population of Osh and its 
surroundings. Uzbek singers and Uzbek language television serials 
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are popular among Uzbeks and Kyrgyz alike, and a young man vis-
iting family in Osh from Tashkent told me that these Uzbek stars 
are in fact more popular in Osh than they are in Tashkent, where 
most prefer Western pop culture. 
In full recognition that Central Asia does not exist in isolation 
and that linguistic attitudes and identities also change in respect to 
new external influences, the demand for and popular status of the 
English language must be acknowledged. Most schools incorporate 
English as a subject from the fourth grade until graduation from 
secondary education, and many of the young people interviewed 
stressed the importance of English as the current language to learn 
and speak. Not only are schools doubled-tracked in Russian and 
Kyrgyz, as described earlier, but new Turkish lyceums are open-
ing up all around the city, where classes are attractively conducted 
with English as the language of instruction, and Turkish—Central 
Asia’s perceived connection to the rest of Europe nowadays—being 
a language subject. 
CONCLUSION: CODE-SWITCHING & THE FUTURE OF 
KYRGYZ IDENTITY
Expressed attitudes aside, perhaps most interesting and tell-
ing are the actual behaviors and habits of language choice and usage. 
The phenomenon of particular note here is the manner of habitual 
code-switching between Kyrgyz and Russian, Uzbek and Russian, 
or all three that has become the norm for communication at home 
and, more often, with friends, especially among the youth of Osh. 
Code-switching is a common linguistic phenomenon in situations 
of extended language contact. Formal analyses of code-switching 
often define it through systematic classification of its structures; 
for example, differentiating it from other phenomena of linguistic 
contact as intrasentential embedding of phrases and words of one 
language into the syntactic structure of another “matrix” language. 
Here, I am less concerned with the strict forms of code-switch-
ing, and more interested in the social performance and usage of 
“switching” as a broader category. Contemporary studies of the so-
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cial importance of code-switching have been largely preoccupied 
with power and prestige, analyzing specific motions of switching 
to convey authority or deference. Certainly these instances of code-
switching between Russian, Kyrgyz, and/or Uzbek can also be 
examined in this fashion and certainly individuals do consciously 
switch in certain situations to strategically communicate some-
thing about social relationships. But what is particularly telling 
about the multiplicities of identity in the situation I encountered in 
Osh, and which is applicable across most parts of Central Asia, is 
the way “code-switching” has become the norm in communicating, 
particularly among the younger generations.  Many young Uzbek 
and Kyrgyz describe it as being the most “natural” and “comfortable” 
way of communicating for them—easier and more familiar than 
speaking in pure Russian, Kyrgyz, or Uzbek. Carol Meyer-Scot-
ton writes that “codeswitching can index a speaker’s self-perception, 
as a multidimensional person, whether as a member of a specific 
group, or as a member simultaneously of several groups. As a tool, 
codeswitching can be used in an ongoing conversation to step in—
or out—of a presumed or expected identity” (Myers-Scotton 2006, 
73). Habitual code-switching is code-switching that has become so 
normalized that jumps from one identity to another are no longer 
taken purposefully or even consciously. It reflects the simultaneous 
layering of multiple identities, and often suggests that these identi-
ties exist on the same level and with the same degree of comfort 
and sense of belonging. It socializes the youth of Osh into a diverse 
community that does not define itself statically as purely Kyrgyz, 
Uzbek, or Russian in everyday life, but where identity is constantly 
being negotiated. 
Thus, linguistic identity and language in everyday usage re-
flects a rich mix of all the historical legacies, religious influences, 
cultural contacts, and ethnic interplays that have touched the re-
gion, from pre-Tsarist times through the Tsarist and Soviet peri-
ods. It shows that despite contemporary official policies to assert 
the dominance of one consolidated nationality over the others, 
identity in Central Asia will most likely remain fluid, multifaceted, 
and versatile.
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